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Since 1992 Ethiopia has been engaged in liberalizing its financial sector. The hallmark 
of the strategy is gradualism. The approach is not without problems especially from 
Bretton Woods Institutions that saw the reform as a sluggish process. This study 
examines this liberalization program by analyzing the performance of the sector before 
and after the reform. The study notes that given the nascent development of the 
financial sector in the country, the relatively good shape in which the existing financial 
institutions find themselves, and given that supervision and regulation capacity of the 
regulating agency is weak, the government’s strategy of gradualism and its over all 
reform direction is encouraging. However, we argue for charting out clearly defined 
time frame for liberalization and exploring the possibility of engaging with foreign 
banks to acquire new technology that enhance the efficiency of the financial sector in 
general and the banking sector in particular. 
 
Keywords: financial sector development, growth, banking, financial liberalization, 
Ethiopia, Africa 
JEL classification G20 G21 G32 O16  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Lorraine Telfer-Taivainen at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
Acknowledgements 
I thank my former students Seife Dender and Abera Sebeta. 
 
   1
1 Introduction 
One of the main objectives of financial institutions is mobilizing resources (in particular 
domestic saving) and channeling these to would-be investors. This intermediation role 
of financial institutions takes different forms in different economic systems. Ethiopia’s 
history of the last three decades clearly shows the validity of this statement.  
 
Under state socialism (1974-91), popularly referred to in Ethiopia as the ‘Derg
1 regime’, 
financial institutions were basically executing the economic plans outlined by the 
central planning organ. In that period regulation and supervision were not critical 
because the national plan regulated and directed the activities of financial institutions. 
Moreover, financial institutions were directed to finance some public projects that may 
not have passed proper financial appraisal but were simply based on either ideological 
grounds or ‘merit wants’ arguments. 
 
Following the demise of the Derg regime in 1991, post-1991 economic policy witnessed 
a marked departure from the previous Socialist system. The main difference lay in 
openly adopting a market-oriented economic policy. In fact many of the policies 
adopted by the new government in Addis in 1991 had already been proposed by the 
defunct Derg regime as it approached the end of its reign. This new change in policy 
brought about a significant change in the functioning of the financial sector. Not only 
was the financial sector going to serve the private sector, which had hitherto been 
demonized, but new private financial institutions were also emerging. At the same time 
the role of the Ethiopia’s central bank, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), was also 
reformulated. Thus, financial sector reconstruction was at the top of the government’s 
agenda. 
 
In undertaking this task the Ethiopian government adopted a strategy of (a) gradualism: 
gradual opening up of private banks and insurance companies alongside public ones, 
gradual liberalization of the foreign exchange market, and so on, and (b) strengthening 
domestic competitive capacity before full liberalization (that is, restricting the sector to 
domestic investors, strengthening the regulatory and supervision capacity of the NBE, 
giving the banks autonomy, and opening up the interbank money market). In line with 
this strategy various proclamations and regulations have been passed since 1992 (Geda 
and Dendir 2001). 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 a brief overview of 
Ethiopian banking history is presented. This is followed with an analysis of the financial 
sector in the pre- and post-reform periods in section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                 
1 An Amharic term meaning ‘the committee’ (of soldiers).   2
2  A brief history of banking in Ethiopia 
The history of the use of modern money in Ethiopia can be traced back more than 2000 
years (Pankhrust 1968 cited in Gedey 1990). It flourished in what is called the Axumite 
era which ran from 1000 BC to around AD 975. Leaving that long history aside, modern 
banking in Ethiopia started in 1905 with the establishment of Abyssinian Bank which 
was based on a fifty year agreement with the Anglo-Egyptian National Bank. In 1908 a 
new development bank (called Societe Nationale d’Ethiope Pour le Development de 
l’Agriculture et du Commerce) and two other foreign banks (Banque de l’Indochine and 
the Compagnie de l’Afrique Orientale) were also established (Pankhrust 1968 cited in 
Degefe 1995). These banks were criticized for being wholly foreign owned. In 1931 the 
Ethiopian government purchased the Abyssinian Bank, which was the dominant bank, 
and renamed it the Bank of Ethiopia—the first nationally owned bank on the African 
continent (Gedey 1990: 83; Degefe 1995: 234). 
 
During the five-years of Italian occupation (1936-41) banking activity expanded. The 
Italian banks were particularly active. Table 1a shows most of the banks that were in 
operation during this period. After independence from Italy’s brief occupation, where 
the role of Britain was paramount owing to its strategic planning during the Second 
World War, Barclays Bank was established and it remained in business in Ethiopia 
between 1941 and 1943 (Gedey 1990; Degefe 1995). Following this, in 1943 the 
Ethiopian government established the State Bank of Ethiopia. The establishment of the 
Bank by Ethiopia was a painful process because Britain was against it (see Degefe 1995 
for an interesting neo-colonial story). The Bank of Ethiopia was operating as both a 
commercial and a central bank until 1963 when it was remodeled into today’s National 
Bank of Ethiopia (the Central Bank, re-established in 1976) and the Commercial Bank 
of Ethiopia (CBE). After this period many other banks were established; and just before 
the 1974 revolution the banks listed in Table 1b were in operation. 
 
All privately owned financial institutions including three commercial banks, thirteen 
insurance companies, and two non-bank financial intermediaries were nationalized on 
1 January 1975.
2 The nationalized banks were reorganized and one commercial bank 
(the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia), a national bank (recreated in 1976), two specialized 
banks—the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), renamed recently as the 
Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) and a Housing and Saving Bank (HSB), renamed 
recently as the Construction and Business Bank (CBB), and one insurance company 
(Ethiopian Insurance Company)—were formed. Following the regime change in 1991 
and the liberalization policy in 1992, these financial institutions were reorganized to 
                                                 
2 The commercial banks were Addis Ababa Bank, Banco di Napoli and Banco di Roma. The insurance 
companies were African Solidarity, Ethio-American life, Blue Nile, Ethiopian General, Imperial, Afro-
Continental, Pan-African, Union, Ras, and Ethiopian Life and Rasi. The non-bank financial 
intermediaries were the Imperial Saving and Home Ownership Public Association and the Mortgage 
Corporation (Degefe 1995: 273).   3
work to a market-oriented policy framework. Moreover, new privately owned financial 
institutions were also allowed to work alongside the publicly owned ones. The rest of 
this chapter examines these financial institutions. 
Table 1a: Banks in operation during the brief period of Italian occupation (1936-41) 
Year of establishment 
(European calendar) 
Name of bank  Number of branches 
1914*  Banco di Italy  9 
1914*  Banco di Roma  18 
1939  Banco di Napoli  4 
1939  Banco Nacionale (De’s Voro)  4 
1939 Casa  de  Creito  1 
1939  Society Nacionale di Ethiopia  1 
Total   37 
Source: Gedey (1990). *These two banks of Italian origin were established before the Italian occupation. 
Table 1b: Banks in operation before the 1974 revolution 
Year of establishment 
(European calendar) 
Name of bank  Number of 
branches 
Capital at the date 
of establishment 
(in millions Birr) 
Nd  Banco di Napoli  1  2.0 
1963  Imperial Saving and Home 
Ownership Public Association 
1 0.6 
1963  National Bank of Ethiopia, NBE  4  10.0 
1963  Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, CBE  65  35.0 
1963  Addis Bank Share Co.  26  5.0 
1964  Ethiopian Saving and Mortgage S. 
Co. 
2 3.0 
1964  Ethiopian Investment Corporation 
S.C. 
1 20.0 
1966  Banco di Roma (Ethiopia) S.C.  8  4.0 
1969  Agricultural and Industrial Dev. 
Bank 
5 100.0 
Source: Gedey (1990). 
 
3  The structure and performance of the financial sector in the pre- and post-
reform periods 
Following the McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) paradigm, financial liberalization has 
been high on the agenda of developing countries. The financial repression school (as it 
is sometimes referred to) argues that government intervention in the finance sector, in 
particular through subsidized interest rates and (favoured) credit allocation, not only 
distorts the financial market but also depresses savings and leads to inefficient 
investment. The policy prescription that follows is liberalization. This has been 
endorsed by the international financial and development institutions, such as the World   4
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and was high on the agenda of the 
reform packages prescribed for most developing countries called Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs). 
 
Many of the developing countries, with the exception of a few in Asia, that went 
through this agonizing reform process have been unable to enjoy the promised benefits 
in general, and the promised financial sector prosperity in particular. Vos (1993) noted 
that the major factors which could explain the failure of financial liberalization in Latin 
America and its success in Asian countries (such as South Korea and Taiwan) were the 
control and intervention by the state to address structural problems without disregarding 
market-oriented performance criteria. Thus, for Vos, gradualism and addressing some of 
the gaps in financial sector reform—such as the lack of sensible prudential supervisory 
capacity in place before the onset of reform—are crucial. 
3.1  The pre-reform financial sector in Ethiopia 
The pre-reform period here refers to the period 1974 to 1991 (the Derg regime). During 
this period all private banks were nationalized. The National Bank of Ethiopia was at 
the apex of the banking structure and was engaged in all the functions of a central bank. 
As noted earlier, CBE, AIDB (DBE), HSB (CBB) were in operation during this period. 
In addition to these banks, there were also two other financial institutions: Ethiopian 
Insurance Corporation (EIC) and the Pension and Social Security Authority (PSSA).  
 
The CBE, followed by the DBE, were and remain the most important banks in the 
country both before and after reform. Owing to the dominant position of these two 
banks, their major activities and performance is discussed at length below. This helps to 
provide a picture of banking activity in the country both before and after the 1992 
reform. 
The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia  
The CBE was established in its present form by a merger of one of the nationalized 
private bank (Addis Bank) with that of the publicly owned commercial bank by 
proclamation No. 184 (1980). The CBE is directed by a board and managed by three 
mangers (one general and two deputies) appointed by the government. The management 
is supported by detailed monthly and quarterly reports from the bank’s various 
branches.  
Mobilization of deposits 
Table 2a shows the mobilization of deposits by the CBE in the pre- and post-reform 
period. The Table shows that the CBE is the dominant bank accounting for more than 
90 per cent of the total deposits mobilized in the country in the pre-reform period. This 
share is the highest for demand deposits (100 per cent) followed by saving (96 per cent) 
and time (45 per cent) deposits. Thus, to study the CBE in the pre-reform period 
basically equates to studying the banking sector in Ethiopia.    5

































   Before reform 
1979/80 692.8  100.0  442.2  97.7  186.0  51.4  1,321.0  87.6 
1980/81  199.3  100.0 47.8  71.8  42.4 76.4  289.5 90.1 
1981/82  91.9  100.0 58.3  91.0  20.3 82.9  170.5 94.5 
1982/83 169.4  100.0  108.6  92.3  14.5  52.3  292.5  92.9 
1983/84 1,258.2  100.0  761.1  95.1  292.1  56.2  2,311.4  89.6 
1984/85 1,531.3  100.0  812.8  95.7  340.1  59.0  2,684.2  90.8 
1985/86 1,784.7  100.0  939.2  96.5  324.8  56.6  3,048.7  91.5 
1986/87 2,029.3  100.0  1,053.2  97.0  182.3  30.3  3,264.8  87.8 
1987/88 2,251.1  100.0  1,208.0  95.4  111.8  19.8  3,570.9  87.5 
1988/89 2,255.8  100.0  1,367.1  95.4  155.3  23.3  3,778.2  86.8 
1989/90 2,496.0  100.0  1,574.5  96.1  130.8  18.2  4,201.3  86.5 
1990/91 2,602.9  100.0  1,676.7  95.7  134.8  17.6  4,414.4  86.2 
Average 
(1979/80- 
1990/91) 1,446.9  100.0  837.5  93.3  161.3  45.3  2,445.6  89.3 
   After reform 
1991/92 2,869.9  100.0  1,999.1  95.8  152.9  21.4  5,021.9  88.6 
1992/93 3,460.7  100.0  2,450.5  95.1  315.6  44.4  6,226.8  92.3 
1993/94 4,211.4  100.0  2,844.3  94.6  381.2  49.1  7,436.9  93.0 
1994/95  5,503.5 99.8  3,649.3  94.8  445.5 62.6  9,598.3 95.3 
1995/96  6,038.2 99.2  4,584.8  95.5  570.6 75.8  11,193.6 96.2 
1996/97  7,067.9 96.2  5,090.2  89.5  546.7 64.6  12,704.8 91.5 
1997/98  9,197.5 96.3  5,623.1  86.7  697.5 41.6  15,518.1 87.6 
1998/99  8,579.5 94.5  6,000.1  84.0  437.3 27.1  15,016.9 84.2 
1999/00  9,862.0 94.0  6,648.8  80.2  406.2 26.8  16,917.0 83.3 
2000/01  10,857.6 93.2  7,474.5  76.4  490.4 28.6  18,822.5 81.3 
2001/02  11,055.8 90.6  8,087.5  73.2  445.5 25.0  19,588.8 78.3 
2002/03  12,070.1 88.8  8,685.4  69.5  378.3 20.0  21,133.8 75.5 
Average 
(1991/92- 
2002/03)  7,564.5 96.1  5,261.5  86.3  439.0 40.6  13,265.0 87.3 
Source: Annual Reports of National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), various years. 
 
 
The CBE’s share of total deposits has dropped to an average of 87 per cent in the post-
reform period; the figure for 2002/03 was 75.5 per cent. The sharp decline in CBE’s 
share in total deposits observed in 2002/03 was primarily due to the performance of the 
new private banks, in particular the Awash and Dashen Banks. The share of the CBB 
and DBE has also increased (see Table 2a). 
 
Clearly there is an evolving structural shift when deposits are observed by institutions 
(that is, by type of ownership). In general the trend is to move away from a dominant   6
public sector towards a financial structure where the role of the private sector is 
becoming increasingly important. In general, during the two periods (before and after 
the reform), demand deposits by the private sector and individuals increased; the share 
of cooperatives declined; and the share of public enterprises and agencies declined. 
Financial agencies’ share also declined while the central government’s share increased. 
In terms of saving and time deposits, the private sector had the lion’s share in both 
periods. This is attributed to the government’s rule restricting public enterprises and 
agencies from holding such deposits (Geda 1999).  
Loans and advances 
Tables 2b and 2c show the CBE’s outstanding loans disaggregated by sector and 
‘institution’. In the years immediately before reform (1985-91) the CBE’s average 
outstanding loans were highest in the international trade sector (15 per cent in 1989) 
followed by housing and construction and domestic trade (about 6 per cent) and 
industry (5.5 per cent). In the post-reform period, outstanding loans with the 
international trade sector grew enormously (reaching an average19.3 per cent for the 
period 1992-2003). This was followed by domestic trade (12.6 per cent), industry (7.2 
per cent) and transport and communication (5.4 per cent). Loans to central government, 
which were about 62 per cent in pre-reform period, declined by nearly half to 36 per 
cent in the post-reform period. This perhaps indicates the discipline the government was 
exercising in its fiscal and monetary polices. 
 
When the outstanding loans by institutional are broken down, outstanding loans to 
public enterprises (which were about 27 per cent in last five years of the pre-reform 
period) declined to an average of 15 per cent in the post-reform period, the figure for 
2002/03 being 5 per cent. The share of the private sector, however, increased from 14 
per cent to 47 per cent between the two periods. This is attributed to the liberalization 
programme which resulted in the increasing exposure of the CBE to competition from 
the private sector. As for the government, as noted above, the CBE’s outstanding loans 
to government dropped by nearly half. 
   7


















(ave)    
Central  government    61.7 58.1 53.5 59.7 65.7 70.7 61.6  36.2    
Agriculture    1.9 2.7 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.3 2.0 2.6       
Industry 4.4  5.0  5.9 6.7 5.6 5.3 5.5  7.2    
Domestic  trade  5.7 7.2 8.8 5.5 4.7 3.7 5.9  12.6       
International  trade  14.5 15.9 17.4 16.4 13.8 10.6 14.8  19.3    
    export  8.9 6.0 5.6 7.5 5.1 5.7 6.5 7.7       
  imports  5.6  10.0  11.8  8.9 8.7 4.9 8.3  11.7       
Housing & construction  7.0  6.3  6.4 6.0 5.7 5.5 6.1  4.1    
Transport & communication  3.2  3.0  4.2 2.7 2.0 1.8 2.8  5.4    
Hotels and tourism  0.5  0.5  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.3       
Mines, power & water res.  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0       
Personal  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2       
Others  0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5  11.2       
Total (Birr, millions)  2,352.7  2,500.0  2,800.0 3,130.4 3,406.2  3,721.1      
  inter-bank lending  19.4  18.6  17.7  24.2  25.9  25.1      
Grand total (Birr, millions)  2,372.1  2,518.6 2,817.7 3,154.6 3,432.1  3,746.2      

























Central government   52.3 46.8 34.5 32.2 22.0 20.9 22.4 22.1 41.5 47.1 55.9 
Agriculture    0.9 1.4 2.2 2.4 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 2.4 2.8 2.3 
Industry  11.0 8.9 6.1 6.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.1 6.4 5.6 5.5 
Domestic  trade  8.6 14.0 16.7 19.5 20.4 18.3 12.9 12.5 6.9 5.3 3.6 
International  trade  19.0 18.9 20.8 19.6 25.0 25.3 24.6 21.8 15.5 13.7  8.1 
  export  8.2  10.1  9.8  7.3  9.8 9.5 9.7 7.4 5.6 4.0 2.7 
  imports  10.8  8.8  11.0  12.3  15.2 15.9 14.8 14.4 9.9 9.7 5.4 
Housing & construction  4.1  4.1  4.1  4.0 4.5 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.0 3.3 3.8 
Transport & communication  2.7  4.1  6.6  9.6  10.0 8.3 4.8 5.9 3.4 2.2 1.4 
Hotels and tourism  0.9  1.3  2.4  1.8 2.0 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.5 
Mines, power & water res.  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Personal  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Others  0.2 0.5 6.4 4.2  4.9 10.1 18.6 21.4 19.1 18.8 18.7 
Total  (Birr,  millions)  5008.9 5596.5 7450.9 8841.7  9497.1 10486.9 11582.7 12097.9 16620.4 17338.8 17943.3 
  inter-bank lending  110.6  128  179.5  527.6 540.8 496.7 546.9 676.9 564.3  0 456.6 
Grand total (Birr, millions)  5119.5  5724.5 7630.4 9369.3  10037.9 10983.6 12129.6 12774.8 17184.7 17338.8 18399.9 
Source: CBE, Annual Reports, Various years and Statistic Review of CBE.   9
Table 2c: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia: outstanding loans and advances by institutional category 




















1985/86 1,451.1  565.8 19.4  546.4  355.2  2.8 352.4  2,372.1 
1986/87 1,451.6  655.5 18.6  636.9  411.5 29.8 381.7  2,518.6 
1987/88 1,497.8  846.6 17.7  828.9  473.3 20.8 452.5  2,817.7 
1988/89 1,868.5  897.8 24.2  873.6  388.3 22.1 366.2  3,154.6 
1989/90 2,239.3  812.1 25.9  786.2  380.7 12.7 368.0  3,432.1 
Average value  
(1985/86-89/90) 1,567.3  741.4  20.0 721.5  407.1  18.9 388.2  2,715.8 
Average annual share 
(1985/86- 89/90)  57.7 27.3  0.7  26.6  15.0 0.7  14.3  100.0 
End of period (1988/89) 
share  59.2 28.5  0.8  27.7  12.3 0.7  11.6  100.0 
After reform   
1992/93 2,617.4  1,492.6 110.6  1,382.0  1,009.5 33.1  976.4  5,119.5 
1993/94 2,617.2  1,616.6  128.0 1,488.6  1,490.7  65.7 1,425.0  5,724.5 
1994/95 2,573.7  1,953.1 179.5  1,773.6  0.0  107.7 2,995.9  7,630.4 
1995/96 2,847.2  2,403.2  527.6 1,875.6  4,418.9  107.0 4,311.9  9,669.3 
1996/97 2,089.8  2,113.6  540.8 1,572.8  5,834.5  122.3 5,712.2  10,037.9 
1997/98 2,193.1  1,984.5  496.7 1,487.8  6,806.0  113.0 6,693.0  10,983.6 
1998/99 2,599.8  1,740.1  546.9 1,193.2  7,789.7  339.6 7,450.1  12,129.6 
1999/2000 2,675.8  2,027.0 676.9  1,350.1  8,072.0  325.1 7,746.9  12,774.8 
2000/01 6,901.3  1,733.9  564.3 1,169.6  8,549.7  261.2 8,288.5  17,184.8 
2001/02 8,160.7  1,449.5  0.0 0.0  7,728.6  298.4 7,430.2  17,338.8 
2002/03 10,038.7  986.5  0.0 0.0  6,917.9  283.9 6,634.0  17,943.1 
Average value  
(1992/93-2002/03) 4,119.5 1,772.8  342.8  1,208.5 5,328.9  187.0  5,424.0 11,503.3 
Average share  
(1992/93-2002/03)  35.8 15.4  3.0  10.5  46.3 1.6  47.2  100.0 
End of period (2002/03) 
share 55.9  5.5  0.0  0.0 38.6  1.6  37.0  100.0   10
Table 2d: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia: loan collection by institutional disaggregation  















Total  Total less IB 
lending 
1985/86 0.0  117.5  0.9 116.6  206.8  3.6 203.2  324.3  97.6 
1986/87 0.0  137.4  0.0 137.4  137.0  9.0 128.0  274.4  0.0 
1987/88 0.0  186.0  0.9 185.1  218.8  66.8 152.0  404.8  0.0 
1988/89 0.0  143.8  0.9 142.9  174.4  49.1 125.3  318.2  0.0 
1989/90 0.0  172.3  0.9 171.4  223.2  30.5 192.7  395.5  0.0 
1990/91 0.0  107.1  0.9 106.2  172.8  36.7 136.1  279.9  0.0 
Average annual value 
(1985/86-90/91)  0.0 151.4  0.7  150.7  192.0 31.8  160.2 343.4  19.5 
Average annual share 
(1985/86-90/91) 0.0  44.1  0.2 43.9  55.9  9.3  46.7 100.0  5.7 
After reform   
1992/93 0.0  160.3  1.7 158.6  373.8  49.3 324.5  534.1  0.0 
1993/94 0.0  443.1  1.4 441.7  892.4  35.9  856.5 1,335.5  0.0 
1994/95 0.0  283.5  1.3  282.2 1,180.0  239.4  1,516.9 2,039.8  2,038.5 
1995/96 0.0  303.6  0.0  303.6 2,399.3  292.5  2,106.8 2,702.9  2,703.0 
1996/97 0.0  338.7  71.9  266.8 2,418.1  243.9  2,174.2 2,756.8  2,684.9 
1997/98 0.0  197.3  44.3  153.0 2,494.1  342.7  2,151.4 2,691.4  2,624.7 
1998/99 0.0  187.3  75.9  111.4 2,572.6  294.5  2,278.1 2,759.9  2,684.0 
1999/00 0.0  256.6  102.4  154.2 1,916.1  365.7  1,550.4 2,172.8  2,070.3 
2000/01 0.0  290.3  146.8  143.5 2,366.2  501.3  1,865.0 2,656.5  2,509.7 
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2001/02 0.0  93.3  0.0 0.0  2,016.4  481.4  1,535.0 2,109.7  82.7 
2002/03 0.0  154.2  0.0 0.0  2,073.4  339.4  1,734.0 2,227.6  59.8 
Average annual value  
(1992/93-02/03)  0.0 246.2  40.5  183.2  1,882.0 289.6  1,644.8 2,180.6 1,587.1 
Average annual share 
(1992/93-02/03) 0.0  11.3  1.9 8.4  86.3 13.3  75.4 100.0 72.8 
Source: CBE, Annual Reports, Various years and Statistic Review of CBE. 
Table 2e: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia: loan collection by sector (% unless otherwise stated) 
Before reform 




    
Central government   0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0       
Agriculture   4.8  3.6  15.4  10.1 5.2  1.5  6.8 14.6       
Industry 19.7  12.2  10.9 10.6  16.7 17.7 14.6 12.1       
Domestic trade  27.4  33.4  21.2  36.6 26.5  39.5  30.8 35.1       
International trade  30.2  30.1  37.0 24.3  31.6 20.2 28.9 14.4       
  Export  19.3  17.7  12.1  8.6 23.8  8.3  15.0 7.0       
  Imports  10.9  12.4  24.8  15.7 7.8  11.8  13.9 7.5       
Housing and construction  2.0  2.8 4.5 3.4  2.9 1.8 2.9  2.6       
Transport and communication  8.7  11.3  5.0 9.5  9.2 7.9 8.6 9.9       
Hotels and tourism  2.3  2.8  2.0 2.2  2.6 3.8 2.6  4.0       
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Mines, power and water res.  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0       
Personal 3.8  2.4  2.9  1.8 3.6  5.4  3.3 1.5       
Others 1.1  1.2  1.1  1.5  1.7 2.3 1.5  5.8       
Grand total (Birr, million)  324.3  274.1 403.9 383.1  400.6 334.9          
  interbank lending  0.9  0.0  0.9 0.9  0.9 1.8 0.9  45       
Total (Birr, million)  325.2  274.1 404.8 384.0  401.5 336.7           
After reform  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97 1997/98 1998/99  1999/2000 2000/01  2001/02  2002/03 
Central government   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Agriculture   0.7  2.4  10.5  12.8  9.6 14.0  17.6 22.3 26.3 24.6  19.7 
Industry 25.0  26.7  12.5 8.1 6.9  6.7  8.5  11.6 10.2 9.7  7.3 
Domestic trade  40.8  39.2  47.8  35.6 42.2  36.2  35.2  33.2 27.0 25.6  23.9 
International trade  15.1  14.5  12.5  17.6 16.8  17.3  11.9  4.6 11.3  17.3  19.8 
  export  8.8  9.5  4.4  9.1  6.6 6.2 6.5 1.6 4.3 6.2  13.4 
  imports  6.3  5.1  8.1  8.5  10.2 11.0  5.4  2.9 6.9  11.1  6.4 
Housing and construction  1.6  1.4  0.7 0.3 0.8  2.0  2.2  2.7 2.1 4.5  10.1 
Transport and communication  4.6  5.1  4.8  7.8 12.5 11.9  13.4  14.7 13.0 11.0  9.9 
Hotels and tourism  5.8  4.8  5.0  6.2 3.8  3.8  3.4  3.3 2.7 2.8  2.2 
Mines, power and water res.  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 
Personal 2.9  2.2  1.6  0.9  1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5  1.3 1.2  1.5 
Others 3.6  3.7  4.6  10.7 6.2  6.7  6.6  6.2 6.1 3.3  5.8 
Grand total (Birr, million)  532.4  1334.1 2038.5  2702.9  2684.9  2625  2693 2070.5  2393.9  2112.5  2225.86 
  interbank lending  1.7  1.4  1.2  0.1 71.9 44.2  69.7 102.4 121.1 27.8  56.7 
Total (Birr, million)  534.1  1335.5 2039.7 2703  2756.8 2669.2 2762.7 2172.9 2515  2140.3  2282.56 
Source: CBE, Annual Reports, Various years and Statistic Review of CBE. 
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Loan collection 
In the pre-reform period the highest loan collection was made from domestic trade, 
followed by import and exports, and industry (in order of importance). In terms of 
institutional disaggregation, loan collection from the private sector was significant, 
constituting nearly 47 per cent in the pre-reform period and reaching an average figure 
of nearly 75 per cent in the post-reform period. Loan collection from the public sector 
(state enterprises) had been falling steadily in the pre-reform period. This trend has also 
continued in the post-reform period (it dropped from 44 per cent to 11 per cent between 
the two periods). This indicates the bad financial shape the public sector was in (details 
are given in Tables 2d and 2e). In general, total loan collection has shown a marked 
improvement in the post-reform period. The growth figure, which was generally 
negative in the pre-reform period, changed to a positive one in the post-reform period. 
Thus, the performance of the CBE in this regard is quite commendable. This highlights 
the important point that existing public banks, with proper regulation and a sound policy 
environment, can improve their performance enormously. Hence, privatization, as the 
IMF has argued, may not be the only approach which can bring about efficiency in the 
banking sector. 
Asset quality 
Table 2f shows the quality of assets at the CBE. The liquidity ratio in both periods is 
quite high, being well above the statutory requirement of 20 per cent in all periods. 
These figures show an increasing trend in the post-reform period. The quality of the 
bank’s assets can also be inferred from the ‘loan to deposit ratio’ that increasingly 
shows a declining percentage (notwithstanding the increase in credit) which in turn 
shows that the bank had a strong resource base. By 1998 the loan to deposit ratio had 
the lowest figure of 71 per cent. (Note however, that this analysis is based on official 
figures). Observations and discussions with other researchers showed that non-
performing loan figures, which are usually modest in government reports, need to be 
viewed with caution.
3 However, the main conclusion that can be made from the analysis 
of the bank's asset quality (as reported) is that the CBE has quite an impressive record. 
This can be contrasted with the IMF’s and World Bank’s recommendation to either 
privatize or divide the CBE. On asset quality grounds there is no justification for such a 
policy proposal. The IMF and World Bank argument may stand on competition 
grounds: which I will return to at the end of this chapter.  
                                                 
3 There are unconfirmed reports that put this figure as high as 40 per cent in the last four to five years and 
now (at the time of writing) dropping close to 15 per cent.   14
Table 2f: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia: asset quality of the at the end of the fiscal period, June of each year (Birr, million) 
Year  
Liquid 














Loan to deposit 
ratio (including 
loans to 














1988 0.407  723.9  63.87  0.7927 37.51   18.2  4825.72  
1989 0.348  539.9  60.26  0.8388  34.65   20.7  5021.4  0.041 
1990 0.331  540  63.56  0.8212  29.08 0.04*  23.9  5199.98 0.036 
1991 0.298  428.3  50.79  0.8533  26.08 0.39*  27.4  5363.6 0.031 
After  reform               
1992 0.372  854.3  68.42  0.7846  26.29 0.039 26.1  6090.29 0.135 
1993 0.423  1334.9  86.37  0.8362  42.07 0.026 15.8  9060.84 0.488 
1994 0.534  2319.7  87.86  0.7857  43.75 0.018 14.2  11217.4 0.238 
1995 0.514  2842.6  79.68  0.7881  52.15 0.015 25.4  14273.1 0.272 
1996 0.358  1668.9  57.59  0.8590 61.92   8.4  15858  0.11 
1997 0.4  2938  59.09  0.7982  63.46   12.1  16549.4  0.044 
1998 0.44  4286.9  63.11  0.7113 57.14   10.9   
Notes: [1] Liquid assets which is {cash (local or foreign) + reserves with NBE + demand balance with other domestic banks + deposits with Eritrea Bank + treasury bills + 
demand balance with foreign banks}divided by net deposit balance which is {total deposits–uncleared cheques paid (local)–uncleared effects (foreign)}. [2] is{reserves with NBE 
+ cash on hand in local currency + net foreign assets [foreign assets–short term liabilities]} divided by net demand deposit [total demand deposit–uncleared cheques], 
expressed in per cent. [3] Provision for bad and doubtful debts to total deposits ratio. 
Example: 1988 on this table is fiscal year 1987/88 and 1997 is fiscal year 1996/97. 
Source: Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Annual Reports (various years) and Statistical Review of the CBE. 
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As can be read from Table 2f, the CBE’s total assets showed a modest growth rate 
before reform. In the post-reform period the bank’s assets grew annually by double digit 
figures. In particular, the unprecedented growth of nearly 50 per cent in 1993 is clearly 
associated with the reform process. According to the CBE’s Annual Report, this high 
growth is attributed to the growth in net loans and advances, customers’ liability for 
Letter of Credit (LC), cash with foreign banks, and deposits with NBE (in order of 
importance). In particular loans and advances in 1992/93 increased by nearly 125 
percentage points (constituting nearly 25 per cent of the bank’s total assets, for the first 
time in two decades). This is attributed to the growing demand for credit (and hence the 
effort to satisfy that demand) owing to liberalization. The availability of foreign 
exchange and the devaluation that took place during this period (devaluation of 240 per 
cent in 1992) also contributed to the growth of this figure. Throughout the subsequent 
years loans and advances to the private sector have shown sustained increments. 
 
In sum, the CBE is the dominant bank in the country. Both the quality and structure of 
assets and various performance indicators show that the bank is generally in good shape. 
There are certain areas, such as non-performing loans and failure to adopt new 
technology to improve the efficiency of its services, where the CBE is weak. The 
relevant policy prescription would seem to be to intensify the ongoing restructuring and 
accompany that with prudential regulation. It seems extremely difficult to arrive at a 
policy prescription of privatization from an examination of the existing data, as the 
World Bank and IMF have done. 
The Development Bank of Ethiopia 
The mobilization of deposits by the DBE was fairly stagnant in the five years before 
reform. However, it dropped sharply just before the reform period and during the first 
two years of the post-reform period. At the time of writing the DBE’s level is picking 
up again, and reaching the level registered in the pre-reform period; see Geda (1999) for 
detail.  
 
Table 2g shows the DBE’s loan disbursement by sector. Both in the post- and pre-
reform periods the highest share of loans disbursed went to the agricultural sector. This 
is followed by loans disbursed to the industrial sector. In terms of the magnitude of the 
loans advanced, recent years have seen a marked decline, with total loans advanced 
by DBE declining from 155 million in 1992/93 to about 57 million in 2002/03 (see 
Table 2g). In terms of loan by type of ownership, the bias against the private sector 
witnessed during the pre-reform period is reversed in the post-reform period. This 
reversal shows the success of redirecting the emphasis from public to private sector. 
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Table 2g: Development Bank of Ethiopia: loan disbursement by sector (Birr, million) 
Before reform 
    1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89  1989/90  1990/91      
Agriculture    267.1 132.3 305.1  238.8  214.2  81      
Industry 25.9  38  35.9  110.9  78.9  43.3      
Domestic  trade  0 0 0 0 0 0           
International  trade  0 0 0 0 0 0           
  export  0  0  0  0  0  0           
  imports  0  0  0  0  0  0           
Housing and construction  2.5  0.4 1.4 1.6  1 2.2           
Transport and communication  0.4  0  0  2.9  0.7  0           
Hotels and tourism  0.5  0  1  1.7  4.7  12.7      
Mines, power and water res.  3.9  18  19.8  18.1  19.9  0           
Personal  0 0 0 0 0 0           
Others  0.2  0.2 0 0 0 0           
Total  300.5 188.9 363.2  374 319.4  139.2      
After reform 
    1992/93 1993/94 1994/95  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98  1998/99  1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Agriculture   117.6  27.8  162.5  266.3  275.4 417.5  284.9  223.9  108.5 60.1 31.7 
Industry  24.3 118.9 134.2 153.2  172.9  426  190.8  146.4  124.3 37.9 14.9 
Domestic  trade  0 0  1.1  0 0 0  0  0 0 0 0 
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International  trade  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
    export  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
    imports  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Housing and construction  0.8  0.3  1.6  0.6 32.6 17.7 20.9  41.9 8.9 3.8  1 
Transport and communication  0  0  0  1.8 2.4 0.2  0  0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 
Hotels and tourism  12.3  17.8  22.1  16.1 43.9 32.5 38.6  16.4 6.5 4.2 1.9 
Mines,  power  and  water  res.  0 0  0.2 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Personal  0 0  0.3  0.2 0  104.7 0  0 0 0 0 
Others  0  1.2 14.3 64.3 30.6  138.7 247.4  115.5  83.1 22  7.2 
Total  155  166 336.3 502.5 557.8  1137.3 782.6  544.9 331.8 128.1  56.8 
Source: DBE Annual Report (various years) and DBE (1996). 
 
Table 2h: Development Bank of Ethiopia: outstanding balances of loans and advances by sector (Birr, million) 
Before reform 
    1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91         
Agriculture   1200.2  1358.3  1582.2 1685.1 1835.2 1887.1         
Industry 168.5  170.2  181.2  259.7 328.5 359.2         
Housing and construction  23.1  18.8 19.1 19.3 19.7 20.9         
Transport and communication  42.7  39.3 39.3 25.5 20.3 17.5         
Hotels and tourism  5.8  4.9 5.6 7.2  10.8  20.7         
Mines, power and water res.  19  36.9 55.3 75.4 90.2 86.6         
Personal  0 0 0 0 0 0         
Others  2 0 0 0 0 0         
Total 1461.3  1628.4  1882.7  2072.2 2304.7  2392           18
After reform 
   1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000  2000/01  2001/02 
Agriculture    1966.8 235.2 234.4 475.9 565.9 712.3 897.1  999 1029.8  1052.5 
Industry 437.8  530.7  619.7  852.3 959.6 948.1  1126.6  1228.5 1314.4  1358.9 
Housing and construction  18.7  18.5 17.8  0 84.7  103.7 130 181.9 204  221.8 
Transport and communication  17.5  17.5  15.1 22.9 27.7 26.7 27.5 31.4 33  18.6 
Hotels and tourism  38.3  53.1  73.4 111.4 164.9  212  271 179.1  268.4  259.8 
Mines, power and water res.  74.8  51  42 36.8 29.9 31.5 23.4 24.5  25.6  26.7 
Personal  0  0 2.5 2.5  0  94.6  0  0  0  0 
Others 0  2.1  10.4  234.4 104.1 681.1  1020.9  1376.9 1389.7  1503.8 
Total  2553.9  908.1 1015.3 1736.2 1936.8 2810  3496.5 4021.3  4264.9  4442.1 
Source: DBE Annual Reports (various years) and DBE (1996).   19
Table 2i: Development Bank of Ethiopia: outstanding balances of loans and advances by institutional disaggregation (Birr, million) 
Before reform 
   1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91      
State enterprises  1414.3 1577.3 1811.1 1972.4 2125.2 0      
  financial sector  0 0 0 0 0 0      
  non-financial sector  1414.3 1577.3 1811.1 1972.4 2125.2 0      
Private sector  47 51.1 71.6 99.8 179.5 0     
  co-operatives  27.1 29 46.3 69.7 137.2 0      
  private enterprises and 
agencies 19.9 22.1 25.3 30.1 42.3 0      
Total 1461.3 1628.4 1882.7 2072.2 2304.7 0      
After reform 
   1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02  
State enterprises  2,286.0 478.8 477.6 595.7 464.9 405.8 371.8 336.0 321.4 322.7  
  financial sector  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   
  non-financial sector  2,286.0 478.8 477.6 595.7 464.9 405.8 371.8 336.0 321.4 0.0  
Private sector  267.9 429.3 0.0 1,140.5 1,471.9 2,404.2 3,124.7 3,685.3 3,943.4 4,118.5  
  co-operatives  180.2 210.7 181.5 332.4 322.4 305.7 341.1 368.1 379.5 395.9  
  private enterprises and 
agencies 87.7 218.6 356.2 808.1 1,149.5 2,098.5 2,783.6 3,317.3 3,563.9 3,722.6  
Total 2,553.9 908.1 1,015.3 1,736.2 1,936.8 2,810.0 3,496.5 4,021.4 4,264.8 4,441.2  
Source: DBE Annual Report (various years) and DBE (1996). 
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Outstanding loans were a serious problem in the pre-reform period. This problem has 
eased in the post-reform period, although in 2001/02 their value is estimated to have 
been 4.4 billion Birr (see Tables 2h and 2i). In terms of sector, the agricultural sector 
was the most indebted in the pre-reform period. The industrial sector took over from the 
agricultural sector in the post-reform period, however. In terms of institutional 
disaggregation, outstanding loans were mainly with the public sector in the pre-reform 
period. Again the private sector took over from the public sector in this respect in the 
post-reform period.  
 
The relatively recent phenomenon of high levels of outstanding loans with the private 
sector needs closer attention. Although complete data on arrears was not available, the 
level of arrears in the pre-reform period (in particular in the agricultural sector—where 
the role of state farms was crucial) had reached an alarming level. The arrears which 
were on average above 75 per cent of total principal outstanding in the pre-reform 
period declined sharply to nearly 40 per cent in the first two years of the post-reform 
period owing to the rescue (bailing out) effort by the government (Geda 1999). 
 
In terms of loan collection, the performance of the DBE is not impressive (see Table 2j). 
However, in the post-reform period the DBE made a good effort to collect its 
outstanding loans, particularly from the cooperative and private sectors. Other 
performance indicators of the DBE were not impressive either. For a good part of the 
period under analysis the DBE was operating at a loss and was in bad financial shape, as 
can be seen from the change in working capital. The DBE’s total assets were by and 
large stagnant in the pre-reform period and declined thereafter. In general, since the 
DBE was operating under the auspices of the central planning organ of the government 
and relatively exposed to loss making sectors (such as state farms) its performance 
epitomized the inefficiency in the public sector (Geda 1999). This should be contrasted 
with CBE, which is a public sector entity, yet performed relatively well—even in 
financial terms. Thus, the interesting conclusion is that what matters most is probably 
not ownership but rather exposure (or not) to loss making clients and having (or not) 
management autonomy. 
3.2  The policy regime in the pre-reform period: financial sector and ideology  
The Derg can be characterized as a controlled regime where all economic activities were 
based on the directives that came from the central (national) planning organ. To 
facilitate this, the 1976 reorganization proclamation redefined the role of NBE as a 
developmental organ, as is clearly emphasized by the infamous Article 6 in the 
proclamation, which states that the objective of NBE was ‘to foster balanced and 
accelerated development’. In this period, the NBE was actively involved in the direct 
control of all financial institutions by (a) fixing both deposit and lending interest rates, 
(b) directly controlling the foreign exchange and credit allocation which was done in a    21
Table 2j: Development Bank of Ethiopia: loan collection by sector (Birr, million) 
Before reform 
    1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89  1989/90  1990/91       
Agriculture   92.9  64.3  81.2  92  129.4  61.5       
Industry  11.7 28.8 28.5 20.8  8.9  17.6       
Domestic  trade  0 0 0 0 0 0           
International  trade  0 0 0 0 0 0           
    export  0 0 0 0 0 0           
    imports  0 0 0 0 0 0           
Housing and construction  0.4  2.3 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.7           
Transport and communication  2.7  3.4  0  16.7  6.4  2.8       
Hotels and tourism  0.7  0.6  0.9 0.8 0.8 4.2           
Mines, power and water res.  0.5 2.5 1.9  2 3.1 3.6           
Personal  0 0 0 0 0 0           
Others  0.1  0.2 0 0 0 0           
Total  109 102.1 113.6 133.4 149.3  91.4       
After reform 
    1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Central  government    0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Agriculture   39.3  19.6  108.5  162.6 281.3 318.7  200  221.6 162.9 112.6  99 
Industry 14.9  31.5  31.6  104  105.3  112 134.1  151 149.2  89.6 114.3 
Domestic  trade  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
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International  trade  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
    export  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
    imports  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Housing and construction  0.5  0.6  0.5 0.3 0.9 4.9 3.7  5.1 6.8 5.7 6.4 
Transport and communication  0  0.7  0 2.1  1 0.7 0.9  2 1.9  16.1 0.9 
Hotels and tourism  1.7  3.6  3.8  5.7 12.4 15.8 18.9  19.7 23.4  19 15.9 
Mines, power and water res.  3.9 4  3.1  13.9  9.3 0  9.3  0 0 0 0 
Personal  0 0  0.2  0.2 0  73.2 0  0 0 0 0 
Others 0  0  0.4  6.3  14.5  15.2 94.4  58.7 66.2 24.2 54.5 
Total  60.3  60 148.1 295.1 424.7 540.5 461.3  458.1 410.4 267.2  291 
Source: DBE Annual Report (various years) and DBE (1996). 
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Table 2k: Interest rate developments in Ethiopia post-1991, %  
Deposit rates  Lending rates 
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Note: *since January 1998 the lending rate has been fully liberalized while the deposit rate floor has been 
set at 6 per cent.  
Source: NBE, Quarterly Bulletin 13:1, 1997/98 and NBE Annual Report 2002/03. 
 
discriminatory manner, by favouring the public sector, and (c) directly financing the 
government deficit (NBE 1998). Bank supervision and regulation was largely limited to 
the sporadic inspection of a few branches. 
 
The Derg regime is also characterized by an economic policy largely informed by 
Socialist ideology. The sin qua non of such a set-up is the prominent role accorded to 
the socialized (public and cooperative) sectors by discriminating against the private 
sector. During this time indirect ways of regulating the financial sector were not   24
important because it was directly controlled. The most important financial instruments 
used to control the sector were (a) the interest rate and (b) discriminatory allocation of 
foreign exchange and credit. The interest rate was deliberately set at a very low level 
(repressed). Depending on the degree of socialization, different sectors faced different 
interest rates. The ruling interest rates for each sector in both (pre- and post-reform) 
periods are given in Table 2k. 
 
The socialized sectors were accorded priority in credit as well as foreign exchange 
allocation. All foreign exchange earnings were surrendered to the NBE. The NBE 
rationed this limited supply of foreign exchange to the sectors that were accorded 
priority in the national plan. In general the socialized sectors were prioritized—with the 
private sector the least preferred. Similarly, credit allocation was informed by the same 
ideological considerations. In consultation with the Ministry of Finance and Planning, 
the NBE projected the financial planning of the economy. It identified the financial 
needs of different sectors through surveys and data obtained from credit institutions. 
Based on such information it determined the distribution of credit, favouring priority 
investments and aiming to keep the internal and external purchasing power of the 
national currency unaltered. In credit allocation, financial institutions used credit policy 
as a factor for strengthening and expanding the socialized sector and encouraging the 
socialization of others (Di Antonio 1988: 71-72). This favouring of the socialized sector 
is shown by the fact that a good part of bank resources were directed to the socialized 
sector (for instance 68 per cent of ADB resources were allocated to state farms) and that 
collateral was not required from the state farms and cooperatives when they were 
granted loans (Di Antonio Ibid.: 74). As noted by Di Antonio (Ibid.: 80), this restrictive 
policy resulted in excess liquidity in the banking sector in the 1980s chiefly because of 
(a) the biased credit policy, (b) the collateral requirement on the private sector, 
(c)  seasonal trends and the economic conditions prevailing at the time, and (d) the 
CBE’s inefficiency. The latter two factors were identified by the ‘Liquidity Appraisal 
Committee’ set-up by the CBE to understand the excess liquidity problem. 
4  The structure of the financial system in the post-reform period 
Proclamation No. 84/1994 that allowed the private sector (owners have to be Ethiopian 
nationals, however) to engage in the banking and insurance businesses marked the 
beginning of a new era in Ethiopia’s financial sector. Following this proclamation the 
country witnessed a proliferation of private banking and insurance companies. At the 
time of writing, there were six new private banks (with 115 branches) and eight 
insurance companies (with 79 branches) in operation. The new private banks account 
for about a quarter of the total banking capital in the country. This change took place in 
a matter of ten years. Table 3a gives a list of these financial institutions. 
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Table 3a: Private banks and insurance companies 
Private banks 




1. Awash International Bank  10/11/94 26  132 (4.9%)
2. Dashen Bank S.C.  20/09/95 28  122 (4.6%)
3. Bank of Abyssinia  15/02/96 14  141 (5.3%)
4. Wegagen Bank  30/04/97 23  83 (3.1%)
5. United Bank S.C.  10/9/1998 13  91 (3.4%)
6. Nib International  26/5/1999 11  111 (4.2)
Private insurance companies 
  Date of license Number of branches  (2002/03)
1. Africa Insurance Co.  22/12/94 9
2. Awash Insurance Co  1/10/94 13
3. Global Insurance  14/1/97 4
4. Nib Insurance  2001/02) 4
5. National Insurance Co.  23/9/94 8
6. Nile Insurance Co.  11/4/95 16
7. Nyala Insurance  27/9/95 11
8. United Insurance Co.  9/11/94 14
Note: *For comparison, the total capital of CBE, DBE and CBB respectively was 1277 (47.7%), 75 (2.8%) 
and 643 (24%) millions of Birr. Ethiopian Insurance (the only publicly owned one) has 27 branch networks. 
Source: National Bank of Ethiopia, Annual Report 2002/03 (and various years). 
 
4.1  Performance of the new private banks 
Despite the proliferation of privately owned companies, their relative market share was 
still extremely small. This can be seen from the Tables in this section. Tables 3b and 3c 
show a summary picture of the share of banks in deposit mobilization (and loan 
disbursement) in the pre- and post-reform periods. As can be seen from these tables, the 
dominant position in terms of saving mobilization was held by the public sector in 
general and the CBE in particular. The public sector’s share did, however, fall from 96 
per cent in 1996/97 to 80 per cent in 2002/03. While the share of the private banks rose 
from 4 per cent to 20 per cent over the two periods. This private sector share was 
highest for time deposits followed by saving and demand deposits. 
 
A similar pattern is observed in terms of disbursement of loans, loans outstanding, and 
loan collection. In general, in terms of loan disbursement the share of the public sector 
(the CBE being the dominant bank, accounting from more than 95 per cent of public 
banking sector in the figures analyzed in this section, followed by DBE) declined from 
93 per cent in 1996/97 to 44 per cent in 2002/03. The share of the private banking sector 
increased from 7 per cent to 56 per cent. In terms of loan collection the public banks   26
share declined from 94 per cent to 60 per cent during the two periods, while the share of 
the private sector increased from 6 per cent to 40 per cent. Outstanding loans were 
highest in the public sector, being 96 per cent in 1996/97 and declining a little to 82 per 
cent in 2002/03 (the corresponding figure for the private banks increased from 4 to 18 
per cent). In sum, the private banks are catching up relatively quickly with the public 
banks in almost all banking activities. The disaggregation of disbursed credit by 
institutional category also shows the increasing role of the private sector which can 
chiefly be attributed to ongoing liberalization. 
 
A detailed account of each bank reveals that, using the data for the year 2002/03, the 
most important private banks in terms of deposit mobilization, loan disbursement, and 
loans outstanding were Dashen Bank, followed by Awash International Bank, placing 
Abyssinian Bank in the third place (the only exception being that Wegagan Bank is in 
second place, hence Abyssinia in third, in terms of loan collection and loan 
disbursement). Clearly the trend of the existing data shows that the share of the private 
banks—both in terms of deposit mobilization and lending—could increase significantly 
in the years ahead. It is also worth noting that the share of credit extended to the private 
sector has increased sharply in the recent past while the public sector’s share has 
declined (the share of cooperatives remaining fairly stable) (Geda 1999) 
 
 
Table 3b: Share of deposit mobilization by private and public banks after the 
establishment of private bank (in per cent) 
    1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03  1996/97 
-2002/03 
Public banks                         
Total deposits  95.8  94.4  91.7 89.4 86.7 83.4 80.4  88.8 
  demand deposits  97.2  96.9  95.1 94.6 93.6 91.2 89.5  94.0 
  saving deposits  94.1  90.7  87.7 83.7 79.6 76.5 72.6  83.5 
  time deposits  95.2  94.5  89.7 84.4 80.2 73.5 66.8  83.5 
Private banks                         
Total deposits  4.2  5.6  8.3 10.6 13.3 16.6 19.6  11.2 
  demand deposits  2.8  3.1  4.9 5.4 6.4 8.8 10.5  6.0 
  saving deposits  5.9  9.3  12.3 16.3 20.4 23.5 27.4  16.5 
  time deposits  4.8  5.5  10.3 15.6 19.8 26.5 33.2  16.5 
Source: National Bank of Ethiopia, Annual Report, 2002/03 (and various years). 
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Table 3c: Share of loan disbursed, loan collection, and outstanding balances of banks after the establishment of private banks (%) 
    1996/97 1997/98 1998/99  1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia                      
  loan disbursed  73.4  55.9 57.8 55.7 52.7 48.8 40.6 
  loan collection  77.7  65.9 65.7 59.8 60.6 57.4 50.4 
  outstanding  74.0  70.2  67.2 63.9 68.7 66.9 66.8 
Development Bank of Ethiopia                      
  loan disbursed  15.0  24.6  19.0  14.2 9.4 3.9 1.4 
  loan collection  12.3  13.6 11.2 13.2 10.4 7.3 6.6 
  outstanding  15.1  18.8  20.3 21.2 17.6 17.1 12.9 
Construction and Business Bank                      
  loan disbursed  4.8  1.4 0.8 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.7 
  loan collection  4.0  3.6 4.1 4.1 3.6 3.3 2.7 
  outstanding  7.3  6.1  5.2 4.2 3.3 2.9 2.7 
Public Banks                      
  loan  disbursed  93.2  81.9 77.6 70.9 62.8 53.9 43.7 
  loan collection  94.0  83.1 81.0 77.1 74.5 67.9 59.6 
  outstanding  96.4  95.1  92.7 89.3 89.6 87.0 82.4 
Private Banks                      
  loan disbursed  6.8  18.1 22.4 29.1 37.2 46.1 56.3 
  loan collection  6.0  16.9 19.0 22.9 25.5 32.1 40.4 
  outstanding  3.6  4.9  7.3 10.7 10.4 13.0 17.6 
Source: National Bank of Ethiopia, Annual Report 2002/03 (and various years). 
Table 3d: Exchange rates (Birr per US$) 
 Annual average, Birr/US$  1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00  2000/01 2001/02  2002/03 
1. Official rate   5.09  5.86  6.32 6.47 6.80 8.16  8.26 8.5  8.61  8.64 
2. Marginal rate  5.77 6.25 6.32 6.47 6.80 
(Sept.) 
8.16 8.26  8.5 8.61  8.64 
3. Divergence = [1-2]  Birr 0.68  Birr. 0.39  unified  unified unified unified  unified  unified  unified  unified 
4. Parallel market  7.05  7.30  7.64 7.16 7.23 8.36  8.79 8.31  8.685 8.71 
Source: NBE, Quarterly Bulletin, 1997/98; Annual Report, 2002/02 and 2000/2001.   28
4.2  Other financial liberalization schemes pursued 
Two other important liberalization schemes pursued by the Ethiopian government in the 
post-reform period were (a) the exchange rate policy, and (b) the introduction of an 
interbank money market. As discussed in Section 3, the pre-reform period was 
characterized by discriminatory interest rates and foreign exchange as well as credit 
allocation policies. At the time of writing the interest rate was fairly liberalized and the 
NBE has set a floor only for the deposit rate, leaving all other rates to be determined by 
the market. Banks are now allowed to set any rate within a range. Moreover, pursuant to 
the strategy of gradualism, the NBE implemented this policy step-by step. Interest rate 
policy and actual rates at the time of writing, as well as their evolution, are given in 
Table 2k. 
4.3  The exchange rate policy 
A related policy of liberalization carried out by the government was the introduction of 
the ‘auction-based exchange rate’ determination scheme and the introduction of the 
interbank money market. Again the principle of gradualism (in liberalization) is at the 
heart of this policy development. The exchange rate reform began by devaluing the 
currency which was fixed for nearly two decades at Birr 2.07 per US$1 by 140 per cent, 
to 5 Birr per US$1 in October 1992. Such a massive devaluation was partly justified by 
the premium on the parallel market that was close to 238 per cent. In 1993 the NBE 
introduced the auction-based exchange rate system. This used to be conducted on a 
fortnightly basis and took the form of a ‘Dutch auction’ system (discriminatory price), 
where the marginal rate, which clears the market, is taken as the ruling rate for the 
coming two weeks. The supply of funds for this market came from export earnings and 
loans and grants. The auction-based exchange rate system initially worked side by side 
with the official exchange rate. The system was overseen by a committee composed of 
the NBE, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Development and External 
Cooperation (MEDaC), and two representatives from the private sector. 
 
In the course of its implementation, an intensification of the liberalization effort—
including reducing the bid cover requirement, abolishing of negative import list, and 
reducing the ceiling on demand for foreign exchange—was made. Moreover, after the 
86th auction (in July 1996), the NBE introduced a weekly auction replacing the 
previous auction system. By August 1995 the official or fixed exchange rate (used for 
import of fertilizer, petroleum, and pharmaceutical products as well as Ethiopia’s 
contribution to international organizations and external debt service payments) was also 
unified with the auction rate. The NBE also replaced the retail auction system by a 
wholesale auction system where banks are taken as wholesale bidders (discussed 
below). Table 3d shows the evolution of the official, the parallel, and the auction rates 
in the recent past. 
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4.4  The interbank foreign exchange and money markets  
The NBE issued directives aimed at establishing interbank foreign exchange and money 
markets in 1998 (Directives No. IBM/01/1998 and IBM/02/1998). The establishment of 
this market is primarily motivated by the recognition that the foreign exchange supply 
by NBE through the auction system is not sufficient to satisfy the demand of banks. The 
interbank foreign exchange market (IBFEM) is a wholesale market, where the amount 
traded is large and the spread between buying and selling rates is narrower than the 
norm for commercial transactions. It is an exclusive market for banks to trade foreign 
exchange with each other (NBE Directive No. IBM/01/1998). The directive sets various 
guidelines for the market. For instance, the minimum amount to be traded is 
US$50,000, banks do not charge each other any fees, and all transactions are conducted 
in strictest confidentiality. Banks are also required to report their foreign exchange 
operations to the NBE. Thus, the NBE uses this as one instrument of regulation. It is 
also gradually liberalizing the market because all these functions used to be handled by 
the NBE itself. This market is very active, with a volume of daily interbank foreign 
exchange transactions of around US$160 million in 2002/03. 
 
A related liberalization policy pursued was the establishment of the interbank money 
market (IBMM). The IBMM describes the borrowing and lending of funds between 
banks, microfinance institutions, and non-bank financial institutions at interest rates that 
are freely determined by the borrowers and lenders themselves (NBE Directive No. 
IBM/02/98). The directive specifies how this market should function. For instance, 
transactions should be for a minimum of Birr 300,000, there are specific times at which 
deals and requests for deals should be made, and the nature of collateral required. The 
directive also requires banks to report all their activities in this market on a daily basis 
to NBE. The NBE uses this information to regulate and monitor banking activity. 
Moreover, the NBE has also issued a code of conduct, which has extensive regulatory 
content (see NBE Code of Conduct for IBMM). Between its establishment in 1998 and 
the time of writing, only 11 transactions involving 142 million Birr were traded in this 
market. During this period the average interbank rate stood at 7.8 per cent. According to 
the NBE Annual Report (2002/03), persistent excess liquidity, lack of collateral, and 
weak economic activity are given as possible reasons for the poor performance of this 
market. 
5  Concluding remarks  
Since 1992, Ethiopia has been gradually liberalizing its financial sector as discussed in 
this chapter. The hallmark of the strategy is gradualism. This approach, however, is not 
without problems. The international institutions which sponsor and financially support 
the liberalization process, especially the IMF, are not satisfied with the pace of 
liberalization. This has, at times, reached the point where the IMF has temporarily 
suspended its support. 
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The various policy framework papers jointly authored by the Ethiopian government and 
the staff of the two Bretton Woods institutions are quite comprehensive, embracing 
almost all major polices. Thus, it is difficult to relate any disagreement between 
Ethiopia and the IMF and World Bank solely to the financial sector. Examination of 
such policy framework papers reveals that: (a) since the onset of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme in Ethiopia, the performance has by and large been in line with 
the target set in the document (there have been occasional years where the performance 
has been both above and below the target), and (b) when the time schedule set in the 
policy framework papers and the actual implementation of policies are compared, the 
Ethiopian government has been behind schedule on many occasions. However, it is 
interesting to note that this has not usually led to disagreement between the IMF and 
Ethiopia.  
 
There have been occasions when the IMF has suspended its help. However, an 
examination of the time schedule set in the policy matrix of the various policy 
framework papers and the performance of Ethiopia with respect to these targets reveals 
that if this is the sole cause of disagreement, the IMF should have suspended the 
programme long ago. This obviously points to the possibility of there being other 
explanations that are not apparent in the financial data. An informed guess points to at 
least the following areas of disagreement. First, the World Bank and IMF might 
disagree with the Ethiopian government’s strategy of gradualism in its reform 
programme in general, and in reforming the financial sector in particular. Second, the 
Ethiopian government’s implicit belief in a pragmatic mix between the public and 
private sectors might have been unacceptable to the IMF and World Bank. Third, the 
insistence of the IMF and World Bank on the need for competition by addressing the 
alleged monopoly position of the CBE has been resisted by Ethiopia. This last point is 
quite sensitive because the Ethiopian banking system may be weakened by any 
intervention to address the CBE’s supposed monopoly power (such as breaking it up or 
privatization). This would reduce the Ethiopian banking system’s capacity to compete 
with foreign banks should they be allowed to enter the market at the same time. 
Moreover, the CBE’s strong performance does not signal the need for privatization, 
even unrealistically assuming that privatization is a panacea for such problems (Geda 
and Addison 2003). 
 
In general, given the nascent level of development in using market mechanisms in 
Ethiopia, the challenge of transition from the pre-reform period to the post-reform 
period outlined in this paper, the relatively good shape in which the existing financial 
institutions find themselves, and the weak supervision and regulation department of the 
NBE (which is new and lacks skilled human resources), the government’s strategy of 
gradualism and its overall reform direction need to be appreciated and be supported by 
World Bank, IMF, and other relevant institutions. The only concession that the 
government should make is to clearly chart out a time schedule for its financial sector 
liberalization programme and explore the possibility of joint venture schemes with   31
foreign banks. Obviously the government cannot rationally protect the sector forever, 
and it is time to recognize this and act accordingly. 
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